kenya

 

There has been consistent criticism of Chinese employers in Africa. The commonly held perception is that Chinese companies fail to provide enough job opportunities for locals and rarely try to ease the social problems that suffocate African countries; one just has to look at Michael Sata’s recent electoral success in Zambia as proof of the unrest that the Chinese can cause amongst locals.

The China Road-Bridge Company (CRBC) is an exception. The CRBC has made significant progress in recent years, writes Li Lianxing, by gradually improving its labour relations. It has also indicated that it will implement long-term social programs in Kenya, which is just one of the countries in which it operates.

The statistics tell a favourable story. The ratio of Chinese to local employees is about 1 to 15; at one particular project there are 1,371 Kenyan employees and just 45 Chinese staff. The locals are not restricted to menial work and some are technical staff or occupy management positions.

In addition to these increased job opportunities, Chinese companies – and not just the CRBC – have also shown a willingness to take a more hands on approach in countries like Kenya, through long-term social programs. The primary focus of these social programs is primary and middle schools, as well as a local orphanage.

Jiang Yu claims that Chinese companies as a whole have created 350,000 job opportunities in Africa, and criticism aimed at these companies is based on the activities of just a few corporations. It seems that co-operation between China and Africa is improving, and becoming more mutually beneficial, but it whether or not perceptions of Sino-African relations might start to mend remains to be seen.

 

A few years back I did some research work for a consultancy looking to advise a Middle Eastern state how to invest in Sudanese agriculture, without running into the kind of political backlash that ruined the South Korean company Daewoo’s investment in Madagascan agriculture (details here and here). The deal ended up dying of its own accord, but these types of “food security” deals have since become a major facet of Asian and Middle Eastern investment in Africa, and have become accepted to the extent that African countries are making similar investments in other African countries:

The Egyptian government is hoping to cultivate wheat and other cereals on fertile land in African countries to feed its growing population of over 80 million.

In early September it signed a deal with the Sudanese government to give Egyptian companies access to Sudanese farmland.

… Egyptian officials say African and Nile basin countries, such as Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya, and Ethiopia, are high on a government list as potential places in which to make agricultural investments. They add that, apart from strengthening links with these African countries, the move would help Egypt avoid depending on its limited water resources.

So have we finally put to bed the spectre of neo-colonialism over these deals? Well perhaps not. The article goes on to describe how these other countries might become a bit testy about leasing their limited water resources to already thirsty Egypt. And let’s not forget that the main reason why Egypt needs to look South for more farmland is colossal mismanagement of their land resources under a pretty much planned economy.

We really should put these concerns to bed though, because in many cases selling land for foreign agricultural development increases the quantity of food sold on the domestic market. Part of this obviously depends on profit and product sharing agreements, but these agreements allow for a quick transition from subsistance farming to industrial farming, which can increase yields substantially, as well as providing other benefits.

Of course food output isn’t the only problem. There’s also the problem of relocations, which, though we’re quite used to them in China, is hardly something you’d wish on people elsewhere. The issue is made more complicated by poorly demarcated land rights in Africa, which can significantly add to the pool of people looking for a kickback in relocation schemes. But this is a governance issue, not an issue with foreign investment in farming. And the move of people out of subsistance agriculture is essentially the definition of poverty alleviation.

With peak oil approaching agricultural substitutes will get more valuable, and Africa’s extensive amount of arable land will be increasingly seen as a sustainable revenue source. Industrialization has to happen sooner or later, and this sort of foreign investment speeds the process up. I don’t expect it to be uncontroversial. But lets just say its better that Africa have this sort of problem, than this sort.

 

A team of Kenyan and Chinese archaeologists, carrying out a two-month excavation in and around the coastal Kenyan town of Malindi, have unearthed new evidence of 16th century maritime trade links between China and East Africa. The dig is being carried out at three locations – including the Khatib mosque, where the Islamic Chinese admiral Zheng He is thought to have prayed – and archaeologists hope to find evidence of even older trade links. According to Kenyan newspaper The Standard, the archaeologists are “digging deeper in the hope of retrieving items dating back to 9th and 10th centuries.”

Malindi is one of Kenya’s most popular coastal resorts. It is also known for the nearby ruins of Gedi, a Swahili town that once traded with Venice, Spain and India, as well as China. Once excavations at Malindi are complete, the team will be joined by another ten Chinese archaeologists from Peking University’s School of Archeology and Museology and will begin the underwater excavation of a 600 year old junk, wrecked near the island town of Lamu, also in Kenya. In preparation for this, two officials from the National Museums of Kenya have been trained in underwater archaeology. The Chinese government is reportedly spending 200 million Kenyan shillings (US$2.45 million) on the project.

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