According to Standard Bank, South Africa’s top export to its biggest trading partner, China, is its currency, the rand.

In its Africa Macro report released on Thursday Standard Bank noted that China has been purchasing an average of US$1.1 billion per month of physical rand (notes and coins) since November 2010. “China imported US$3.4 billion worth of ZAR in 2010 and another US$10.9 billion in the first three quarters of 2011,” said Standard Bank. Interestingly, the emerging super power has also been buying around US$1 billion worth of Swiss Francs every month.

China is desperately trying to wean itself off the dollar and in the rand it might see a currency it can more easily control. South Africa’s other big exports, which account for almost a fifth of all African exports to China, are commodities. I’m no economist, but demand for a country’s commodities normally pushes the value of its currency up – witness Australia – and by buying both, might China not be creating its own virtuous cycle?

The Chinese bank ICBC, which owns a 20 percent stake in South Africa’s Standard Bank, has opened an office in Cape Town. At the inauguration of the new office, Jiang Jianqing, Chairman and Executive Director of ICBC, said that the office reflects the depth of his company’s commitment to Africa. A report at 4-traders explains:

By the end of September 2011, the two banks had been involved in over 110 cooperative projects, covering multiple areas such as corporate business, settlement and cash management, IT, money market and risk management. The cooperation brought not only a good return on investment, but also a deeper understanding of the African market for ICBC. The total amount of financing agreements signed by ICBC was over USD7-billion, making ICBC one of the most influential Chinese financial institutions in Africa

China-Africa trade volume reached $122.2 billion in first three quarters of 2011, Ghana Business News has reported. It quotes Shen Danyang, spokesman for the Ministry of Commerce:

Shen said China has become Africa’s biggest trading partner, with bilateral trade growing at an annual rate of 28% over the past 10 years, adding that the level of trade in 2011 is expected to set a new annual record, as bilateral trade has already almost matched 2010. He said China invested $1.08 billion in non-financial sectors in Africa during the first three quarters of 2011, up 87% from one year earlier.

Simon Freemantle and African Boots contributor Jeremy Stevens, who are both economists at Standard Bank, write that China’s investment in African agriculture is set to intensify. The trend, they note, is not without its perils:

The continent suffers from an acute lack of skills and capital in unlocking its inherent potential. Yet, as has been evident in many of the land leasing deals signed in SSA [Sub-Saharan Africa] over the course of the past decade, too often investments are poorly structured, undervaluing the agricultural assets at stake. Managed well, partnerships with China can be meaningful. However, domestic food security must be placed first.

Meanwhile China Daily reports that Chinese construction companies, who had their fingers burnt in North Africa, are looking at investing in developed economies instead. It quotes Diao Chunhe, chairman of the China International Contractors Association:

Market risks are soaring because of political unrest…Accelerating expansion into high-end markets, such as the US and Europe, while stabilizing our traditional markets, is our main strategy during these turbulent times…The outbreak of the sub-prime crisis in the US, and the debt crisis in Europe, both of which resulted in a shortage of funds in developed economies, mean that we have opportunities to increase market share there.

The Financial Times thinks we should bid farewell to the BRICs, because the term corrals together incompatible political systems, ignores other players – like Indonesia and Turkey – and “now obscures more than it illuminates.”

The Brics caught a tide. The idea has brought deserved fame and fortune to its author Jim O’Neill at Goldman Sachs. But it defies the complexities of the shifts in power and interests in the international system. To lump together China and India, Brazil and Russia is to nourish a narrative that the new global order is best defined as a contest between the west and the rest.

The West seems to agree. In a report on the UN Convention on Climate Change in Durban happening later this month, titled COP17: Redefine rich and poor countries, the Mail & Guardian quotes Connie Hedegaard, the European commissioner on climate policies:

We need to discuss whether we can continue to divide the world in the traditional thinking of the North and the South, where the North has to commit to a binding form whereas the South will only have to commit in a voluntary form.

China is unlikely to be persuaded. Its chief negotiator on climate change, Xie Zhenhua, recently met with his BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) counterparts in Beijing, where they no doubt agreed on a common front: making life difficult for America. The US won’t sign the Kyoto Protocol until China agrees to; China won’t sign it until America agrees to. The Middle Kingdom recently edged ahead of the US as the world’s biggest polluter, but says it is still a developing country and as a result can’t afford to be held to the same standards as rich countries. Groupings like BRICS and BASIC help China make this and other arguments, so it will probably see life in the the appellations long after economic analysts declare their passing.

The BRICS are, for example, still opposing foreign intervention in Syria. They released a joint statement on Thursday, saying that “the only acceptable scenario for resolving the internal crisis in Syria is the immediate start of peaceful talks with the participation of all sides.”

In a Daily Telegraph editorial, Damian Thompson, who delights in having been called a “blood-crazed ferret”, has called China’s relationship with Africa not just an example of neo-colonialism, but neo-slavery too:

From a moral point of view, China’s policy towards Africa is despicable. But it’s ingenious, too. Beijing has worked out that, by virtue of being a non-Western power, it can pose as a “developing country” while creating its sub-Saharan satrapies. The anti-racism lobby in the United Nations makes sure that the finger of guilt is pointed firmly at the former colonial powers, who are always happy to put on a display of breast-beating by, say, the Archbishop of Canterbury. Meanwhile, something close to slavery is being quietly reintroduced to the dark continent (which is how China thinks of it).

There are many problems with his narrative, and all narratives like it, but foremost among them is that African people are reduced to a passive, pliable, homogeneous whole. African countries might sometimes get a raw deal from China, but they should take the blame for that too.

You might think Africans would disagree with Thompson, but in a speech yesterday, Zwelinzima Vavi, general secretary of the ANC’s alliance partner COSATU, had this to say:

The scale of the sham of independence of our continent needs to be exposed. Either we export our minerals to our colonial masters, or they control our finances, or both. In some countries, foreign exchange earnings and the operations of their central banks reside with the colonial masters while in others, the mines and strategic industries are owned by colonial masters. In some countries even the land is owned by colonial masters, the very land question that triggered the anti-colonial struggles is now back with a vengeance, threatening livelihoods of many small farmers.

Vavi shrouds who exactly he is referring to in Marxist rhetoric, but this looks like just one item to add to the long list of things on which COSATU and the ANC, which sends its party leaders to Beijing for political education, disagree.

The Lowy Institute is taking your questions about China’s involvement in Africa to He Wenping, Director of African Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. It’s a three part interview. Parts one and two have already been published – here and here – with part three scheduled for next week. He Wenping has so far talked about the nature of Chinese aid in Africa and whether India and China are co-operative or competitive powers on the continent.

From Part I:

China’s aid to Africa is based on projects, not budget support. Traditional donors usually put their money into the recipient’s budget, so maybe it’s easier for corruption to happen. So if there’s a plan to build a hospital in a country, the money will not go through that country’s financial system. It will be delivered directly to the company that’s building the project.

And Part II:

India is a democracy, and of course they are also a very heterogeneous society, so how they maintain stability for a long time, how they can balance rich and poor — I think that experience is very attractive to African countries. But I think China’s experience is also unique, because we have made such economic progress in a single generation. There are now seven Special Economic Zones in Africa receiving Chinese aid. We originally planned to set up five, but then Africa countries were quite enthusiastic, so now the total number is seven.

If you have a question for He, send it to blogeditor@lowyinstitute.org.

Finally, Horace Campbell, who is Professor of African American Studies and Political Science at Syracuse University, has visited Shaoshan, the birthplace of Chairman Mao. His paean to the Great Helmsman is convoluted, but I can’t help thinking that Comrade Vavi would enjoy it. Here’s his conclusion, in which Campbell informs us, with great insight, that “Mao Zedong was a leader who had embarked on a socialist project.”

Africans can learn a lot not only from China, but also from the rest of East Asia. The principal lesson is that none of these societies have been able to lift the standard of living of the people without clear and strong intervention by the state to direct resources. These Asian societies eschewed the crude and vulgar ideas of neoliberal capitalism, and even if they followed a capitalist path, insisted on following paths consistent with their cultural realities. Mao Zedong was a leader who had embarked on a socialist project. Those sections of the political leadership who opened up to the West so that China became a reservoir of cheap labour are now faced with the daily information of the deepening depression and the rise of conservative and semi-fascist individuals and parties all over Europe. There is still a left section of Chinese society and it is my view that the trip to the birthplace of Mao was embedded in that ongoing debate on the paths for China in the 21st century.

 

China’s contribution to various medical aid projects is an aspect of its involvement in Africa that is often overlooked. Recognised as a form of soft power, sometimes dubbed “health diplomacy”, it is structured differently to the network of NGOs and charities that citizens of other countries have established, independent of their governments. Instead, China is one of the only countries that sends government-paid medical workers to Africa for extended periods.

This form of soft power is – perhaps surprisingly – not as new as China’s commercial interest in the continent. The first Chinese medical team arrived in Africa in 1963, to assist in Algeria, a brand new nation that urgently required health care.

Now that China has the financial means – and fewer governmental channels than it did in Mao’s era – it provides most of its assistance in financial terms. The figures – as is often the case with China – are impressive. China’s worldwide aid contribution totalled US$39 billion since the country first launched its foreign aid program in 1950, an article in The Guardian reports. Other estimates indicate that the amount of aid provided doubled between 2006 and 2009 alone. But what exactly constitutes aid, and where have the majority of the billions been spent in recent years? An article published in Wharton Business School’s online journal reports on the use of foreign aid funds:

“More than 40% [of foreign aid funds] were allocated to “aid gratis,” or grants, while the other 60% were distributed between interest-free loans and concessional loans. Concessional loans are used to finance major capital projects with the aim of generating profit. The money is used in the construction of transportation, communications and electricity infrastructure, while less than 9% has been given to developing oil and mineral resources, writes The Guardian. The money for the concessional loans is raised on the market by the Export-Import Bank of China, while grants and interest-free loans are distributed from government finances.”

These are the same loans that allow China to negotiate for the right to resource extraction at extremely favourable rates, but the conditions of Sino-African business arrangements are a separate matter. It is the categorisation of concessional loans as “aid” that is misleading — and worrying. In the context of somewhere like Zambia – where a large proportion of the population is concerned about the extent and nature of Chinese involvement in their country – applauding China for “aid contributions” when more than half of these funds are used for making hardnosed business deals is extremely problematic.

 

There has been consistent criticism of Chinese employers in Africa. The commonly held perception is that Chinese companies fail to provide enough job opportunities for locals and rarely try to ease the social problems that suffocate African countries; one just has to look at Michael Sata’s recent electoral success in Zambia as proof of the unrest that the Chinese can cause amongst locals.

The China Road-Bridge Company (CRBC) is an exception. The CRBC has made significant progress in recent years, writes Li Lianxing, by gradually improving its labour relations. It has also indicated that it will implement long-term social programs in Kenya, which is just one of the countries in which it operates.

The statistics tell a favourable story. The ratio of Chinese to local employees is about 1 to 15; at one particular project there are 1,371 Kenyan employees and just 45 Chinese staff. The locals are not restricted to menial work and some are technical staff or occupy management positions.

In addition to these increased job opportunities, Chinese companies – and not just the CRBC – have also shown a willingness to take a more hands on approach in countries like Kenya, through long-term social programs. The primary focus of these social programs is primary and middle schools, as well as a local orphanage.

Jiang Yu claims that Chinese companies as a whole have created 350,000 job opportunities in Africa, and criticism aimed at these companies is based on the activities of just a few corporations. It seems that co-operation between China and Africa is improving, and becoming more mutually beneficial, but it whether or not perceptions of Sino-African relations might start to mend remains to be seen.

 


On Friday, China, South Africa, Brazil and India all called on developed and highly industrialised countries to make greater efforts to reduce their emissions. The call comes a few months before the United Nations climate summit, which will be held in Durban, South Africa, this November. The meeting will focus on the extension of the Kyoto Protocol targets that are supposed to be met next year, as well as other plans to reduce global emissions.

The success of the Kyoto Protocol is doubtful, because neither China nor the USA has signed the agreement, even though the two countries are the world’s two heaviest polluters. UN statistics from 2007 show that the percentage increase in CO2 emissions between 1990 and 2007 has been greatest in Brazil, China, South Africa and India, especially when compared to developed industrial countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. China’s percentage increase, for example, was 165.7%, whereas the United States increase was only 20.2%.

Are these developing nations trying to divert the attention away from their poor attempts at reducing emissions? Or do they genuinely believe the responsibility to reduce global emissions rests on the shoulders of the developed world?

 

“Right now, Britain is in danger of missing out on one of the greatest economic opportunities on the planet.” These were the concerned words of British Prime Minister David Cameron whilst on his recent, but brief, visit to Lagos, Nigeria, where UK investment and influence has taken a backseat to Nigeria’s blossoming relationship with China.

It is not so much an increased lack of activity between Britain and Nigeria, but rather the extraordinary rise of Chinese business interest in the Nigerian economy that has left Cameron calling for immediate action. In fact, UK exports of goods to Nigeria were up 42% from 2007 to 2008, whilst the exports of services rose 46% over the same period. As Cameron emphasizes, though, there is still some way Britain has to go in order to catch up with China – “Today, Britain accounts for less than four percent of Africa’s exports… almost three times less than China.”

Sino-African trade went from $2 billion in 1999 to $55.5 billion in 2006, and increased further to $73 billion in 2007. Chinese trade with Africa is growing faster than with the rest of the world, as the perceived ‘raw diamond’ quality of African goods has been realised and used accordingly. The Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) reports that “the public investment and economic activities of Chinese in Nigeria have gained prominence in recent time… This type of investment spanned different areas of the Nigerian economy and prominent among them are those in oil and gas, construction especially building of infrastructure.”

Thus, the UK, with Cameron at the forefront, is seemingly determined to increase private enterprise and trade in Africa. UK Trade and Investment is an initiative which encourages UK-based businesses to look for investment opportunities overseas. Furthermore, influential overseas companies are encouraged to create links with companies within the UK. At present, these opportunities are presenting themselves consistently in Nigeria and its neighbours.

China, it seems, has been quick to discover the potential in Africa, as their continued investment and influence proves. The rest of the world, however, is slowly realising what could be achieved in the continent, and Britain, a state with strong links with Nigeria as well as Africa as a whole, is well-placed to build on their relations with Nigeria and thereafter increase their trade and investment. As Cameron states, “we see Africa in a new way, a different way… Yes, a place to invest our aid; but above all a place to trade.”

 

From the NYT (link, and others, below)

The “Loi Obama” or Obama Law — as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street reform act of 2010 has become known in the region — includes an obscure provision that requires public companies to indicate what measures they are taking to ensure that minerals in their supply chain don’t benefit warlords in conflict-ravaged Congo.  The law has brought about a de facto embargo on the minerals mined in the region, including tin, tungsten and the tantalum that is essential for making cellphones.

For locals, however, the law has been a catastrophe. In South Kivu Province, I heard from scores of artisanal miners and small-scale purchasers, who used to make a few dollars a day digging ore out of mountainsides with hand tools. Paltry as it may seem, this income was a lifeline for people in a region that was devastated by 32 years of misrule under the kleptocracy of Mobutu Sese Seko (when the country was known as Zaire) and that is now just beginning to emerge from over a decade of brutal war and internal strife.

Meanwhile, the law is benefiting some of the very people it was meant to single out. The chief beneficiary is Gen. Bosco Ntaganda, who is nicknamed The Terminator and is sought by the International Criminal Court. Ostensibly a member of the Congolese Army, he is in fact a freelance killer with his own ethnic Tutsi militia, which provides “security” to traders smuggling minerals across the border to neighboring Rwanda.

All this might be a price worth paying if the law were having its intended effect of economically asphyxiating the warlords who turned eastern Congo into the deadliest conflict zone since World War II. But by the time President Obama signed the law last summer, the conflict had moved into a different phase. Most of the militias that wreaked havoc between 2003 and 2008 have since been incorporated into the Congolese Army. The two or three of any significance that remain get their money from kidnapping and extortion, not from controlling mining sites or transport routes. The law has not stopped their depredations.

I wrote about this issue back when the law was passing. I said then that I thought it was a really bad idea because the law works on the assumption that transitioning from a failed state to a governed state is like turning on a light switch. Now everyone seems to have come to the agreement that it was a really bad idea because… transitioning from a failed state to a governed state isn’t like turning on a light-switch. It requires co-opting various other power groups, and it requires doing so from a position of strength. The law weakens both the state’s monopoly on power and its ability to assert control over regions which rebels still hold, which is at this point extremely dangerous.

The Chinese on the other hand have actively supported the national government as well as the security and livelihood to those who work for local Chinese mines. Chinese investment in poor African states is usually something of a mixed blessing, but they would have to do a lot before they match the harm done by America.

How Congress Devastated Congo – New York Times

Interview with Eric Kajemba on Conflict Minerals – Congo Siasa

The DRC minerals mess – Texas in Africa

 

Zeray Hailemariam from the Walta Information Centre interviewed the Chinese ambassador to Ethiopia, Gu Xiaojie, this week, about the relationship between the two countries and China’s special relationship which Africa.

China has had a relationship with Ethiopia for over 40 years. Gu Xiaojie said that the countries share mutual trust that there has been an increase in relations between the two countries.

Trade

According to Gu Xiaojie there are “healthy trade ties” between the two countries. China has invested heavily in Ethiopia’s National Network of Telecommunications. Its has also seen a 30% increase in imports from Ethiopia, while China’s exports to Ethiopia have also increased. Gu also said that China provides as much economic assistance to Ethiopia as it can, but that China’s ability to extend aid is limited because it is still a developing country. He emphasised that the relationship between the two countries is more than purely economical, saying there is also a relationship between the peoples of the two countries.

“The people to people relationship is the important one which laid foundation to the over all relations, we see more people coming from China to Ethiopia to do business, studying, working groups and other to get know each other.”

Investment

The Chinese ambassador believes that there are currently over 130 Chinese investors in Ethiopia. While in the past investment was more clear cut, it now appears that investors are diversifying their investments in the country.

“The unique characteristics of the Chinese investment are the ever growing interest of Chinese investors to invest in Ethiopia in diversification. Leather processing and building materials were the first investment sectors by Chinese in Ethiopia. But they are expanding and diversifying to other areas.”

Indirect Colonialism

Zeray Hailemariam asked the Chinese ambassador to Ethiopia about his views on China’s activities in Africa being labelled indirect colonialism. Gu Xiaojie argued that Africa has chosen Chinese involvement.

“From some media, I have read some irresponsible accusations made in this regards. What convincing them to do this unwarranted accusation against China could be the fact that African Governments and the people are in the best position to make a judgement on China’s involvement.”

Gu accused the Western media of portraying the Chinese government as only taking natural resources from Africa. He emphasized that the relationship between Africa and China is not colonial, but brotherly.

“China and Africa know how to treat each other on equal basis and of course the African people have acknowledged and developed sincerity to the Chinese helps.”

Climate Change

Gu Xiaojie also said that China wants to reduce carbon emissions as it recognises that the country has a fifth of the world’s population, but blamed developed nations, which have, he said, been polluting for decades. He said China is working with African countries to reduce emissions. For example, in the Africa China Cooperation Forum, it aims to develop new sources of clean energy with African countries.

 

It seems nothing brings a group closer together than a financial meltdown. Systematically higher growth rates in emerging economies led to a decoupling of potential output, but the severity of the downturn reinforces the notion of cyclical coupling in the interconnected contemporary world. Looking at the debris is telling: the global economy is now at 2008 levels, some USD7.5 bn smaller than most had expected it would be at the start of 2008. Rightly, ideological debate and multilateral reform played second-fiddle during the past three years. The highly synchronised fall in income, employment, output and trade demanded all hands to be on deck.

Truthfully, the exorbitant number of multilateral meetings held since the collapse of Lehman Brothers has yielded very few tangible results. Even the change in emphasis away from the G8 to the G20 was unavoidable: global institutions hoping to retain any semblance of legitimacy in an era of multilateral stasis had to (and still have to) reform. The shift could prove meaningful but crucially depends on the organisations ability to transcend multilateral static and deliver genuine results. Yesterday’s institutions are struggling to address today’s challenges. And won’t manage to deal with tomorrow’s.

To be sure, the recession and recovery period has exaggerated the divergence in economic momentum between advanced and emerging markets. The shift in political influence away from western exclusivity towards a wider inclusive arc of nations (from the East and increasingly the South) has accelerated. Explicitly, the economic momentum of the emerging markets is explaining a proportionately larger share of global fluctuations.

As their economies limp sluggishly ahead, finance ministers from the advanced nations arrive in Seoul, South Korea, exhausted and deflated in equal measure. Enormous fiscal policies intent on generating large domestic multipliers have run aground. Without inventory restocking and stimulus support the artificial recovery has lost momentum. For many the exorbitant explosions in public debt levels are now under the microscope. Financial markets demand credible pathways, back to fiscal respectability. Importantly, the policy response has been varied: for instance, the UK front-loaded fiscal consolidation and the US has spent to mend. Meanwhile, the monetary responses to these largely shared problems have been distinct too. Granted, each major economy cut rates dramatically to divert apocalypse. However, the US Federal Reserve Bank’s USD600 bn tranche in quantitative easing contrasts with the approach of the Bank of England and European Central Bank, which kept rates unchanged in the first week of November. Moreover, commodity-rich nations such as Australia and Canada have already started tightening cycles.

Clearly, with the advanced economies are meaningful variations. Add to the pot, big and small emerging markets and the broader G20 group has rehabilitating structural variations. For instance, the US economy is larger than the combined economies of the non-G7 members; Australia’s income per capita outsize’s India’s by a factor of 50; large surpluses in commodity exporters, Russia and Saudi Arabia, and manufacturing exporters, China, Germany contrast with deficits in the US, UK, India and South Africa; China and India is called home for over two billion people, whereas, Saudi Arabia’s population is less than 30 mn. Finding a lowest common denominator will prove illusory. Worryingly, the new club members bring even more divergent realities, interests and constituencies, further diluting the possibility of galvanizing common cause.

Even though the direction is remarkably clear, the shape and end point of broader reforms are still hazy, muddied by the shipwrecked capitalist system’s flotsam and jetsam. And akin to punch drunk boxers, a number of advanced economies are holding, white-knuckled, to vestiges of power. Most are rightly preparing to be underwhelmed by the ambitions and achievements of the latest G20 meeting. Going further, the shift from the G8 to the G20 could very well turn out to be a false dawn. Rather than a new era of multilateral inclusivity, powers past could be trying to hold onto the distribution of power. Inevitably the G20’s powerlessness could become even more exaggerated. The problem, of course, in this twilight zone scenario is that it impregnates the atmosphere with a false harmony and expectation.

It will become increasingly apparent that navigating a course within this ever-changing environment is complicated. Already he has made clear his disapproval of the manner in which the US has unilaterally opted for a further bout of quantitative easing. South African exporters continue to suffer from an overpriced local currency. While a powerhouse on the African continent, South Africa’s proportionately moderate economic clout globally elevates the importance of multilateral institutions and dialogue platforms for the country to raise the timbre of its concerns. The G20 is, perhaps, the most important forum in this regard. At last year’s Copenhagen summit on climate change, South Africa formed a core component of the BASIC alliance which ultimately scuppered advanced world domination of the pivotal event’s outcome. While not all of Africa’s 53 states agree, South Africa is held by most as the representative of a continent which is bursting with economic potential and incumbent strategic influence.

 

Africans across the continent are likely to have reacted with puzzlement to one of the latest revelations from the stream of leaked United States diplomatic cables from the controversial whistle-blower website WikiLeaks. After a century of aggressive United States economic, political and military engagement in Africa, particularly during the Cold War, it is laughably ironic that Washington is somehow dismayed that China’s foreign policy in the region may not be entirely benevolent.

While history may conclude that the ends did justify the means in the resolution of the Cold War, Africa undeniably paid an extraordinarily high price for its role in American foreign policy during that period. Whether it was Washington’s alliance with brutal dictator Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, Ronald Reagan’s embrace of Jonas Savimbi in Angola or its support of the apartheid government in Pretoria as an anti-communist bulwark.

By any measure, the United States was, and remains, deeply invested in Africa for its own, narrow geo-political interests. And when considered in that context, it is somewhat surprising that the United States appears to be dismayed that China, like other countries, is aggressively pursuing its own economic, political and even military interests in Africa.

In a memo transmitted from the United States Embassy in Lagos, Nigeria on February 23, 2010, Washington’s top diplomat on African Affairs, Johnnie Carson, said: “China is a very aggressive and pernicious economic competitor with no morals. China is not in Africa for altruistic reasons, China is in Africa for China primarily.”

The fact that Carson framed the issue in moralistic terms is fascinating because it reveals so much about how the United States still regards its foreign policy as somehow above the fray, almost with a divine sense of self-righteousness. Implicit in his response is that Washington is in Africa not for its own interests but for the benefit of Africa in pursuit of some “altruistic” purpose. Again, this must seem painfully ironic to those familiar with the history of American foreign policy on the continent.

The Assistant Secretary of State goes on to explain that Washington’s tolerance of Beijing’s engagement in Africa does in fact have its limits if China crosses one of the White House’s so-called “tripwires.”

“Have they signed military base agreements? Are they training armies? Have they developed intelligence operations? Once these areas start developing then the US will start worrying,” Carson said.

So the United States seemingly has nothing to worry about until Beijing embarks on a policy to significantly enhance the militarization of its African foreign policy? Right? Well, it appears that Washington’s perspective adheres to that old adage, to a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

If Carson’s narrow-minded focus on the militarization of Chinese foreign policy is the benchmark of when to “worry” about the competition from the Chinese and his characterization of China’s engagement in Africa in such stark moralistic terms, then the United States truly does not understand the challenge that it is up against and likely stands only a slim chance of mounting an effective policy of its own.

For an American, such as myself, it’s hard to decide whether to laugh… or cry.

 

More on China-Zimbabwe (which I’m writing about at the moment for a publication). I was just looking over two articles, and noticed a strange coincidence:

From February 21, 2010:

Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara says the Chinese want all loans to be repaid before loosening its purse. According to the Mutambara the Chinese President Hu Jintao revealed to him during a brief meeting at the World Economic Forum in Switzerland that he considers Beijing relationship with Harare as ’business partners’ and not ’friends’.

The Chinese are quoted telling the Mr. Mutambara that: “We’ll not condemn you publicly but we’ll not give you cash”. And according to the Deputy Prime Minister, “unless we do the right thing the Chinese will not work with us.”

From February 9, 2010:

Zimbabwe passed a law that compels all businesses with assets worth more than $500,000 to be 51 percent black-owned within five years, according to a copy of the law distributed by Harare-based Veritas Trust.

The law was published in the Government Gazette, a public document. It comes into effect March 1 and stipulates prison sentences of up to five years for non-compliance. Veritas is a Harare-based non-governmental organization that monitors the passage of laws through parliament and their publication.

Oh wait, that’s probably not a coincidence at all.

As I mentioned in a previous post, I have recently spoken to people from Huadian Power who said that after the passage of the February law they lost interest in investing in the country. That doesn’t really explain why the agricultural investments seem to still be going on, but China was obviously not pleased about having their investments redistributed.

Suffusion theme by Sayontan Sinha